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1. Introduction
Each working day, a considerable part of the labor force in many industrialized countries is
on sick leave. Sick leave constitutes an extensive cost to society. This cost compromises not
only neglected and deferred work, but also substantial expenditures on sickness insurance. In
Norway, the sick leave rate has been around 6 to 7% in the last years according to Statistics
Norway. In 2008, public expenditures on sickness insurance were about 2.4% of the Norwegian
mainland GDP. However, sick leave varies a lot within and between countries, and so its
associated costs (Barmby et al. 2002, Bonato and Lusinyan 2004). The search for reasons
behind the variation of sickness absence is thus easily motivated.
The aim of this thesis is to search for economic incentives related to absenteeism at the
firm level. Personell data of a large Norwegian group of companies is examined. The analysis
compromises both employer and employee behavior. First, focus is on possible responses of
the firm to sickness absence. In particular, it is tested if a relation between sick leave and
earnings can be established. Does a firm respond to sick leave by refusing future pay rise? In
addition to this question, several aspects of the employees’ absence behavior are considered. A
closer look is taken at the correlation of sick leave with wage levels and tenure, and if absence
behavior changes when an employee leaves the firm. The other central question is whether
sickness absence is subject to moral hazard.
The results of the analyses performed in this study indicate that economic incentives at the
firm level indeed are important for sick leave behavior. First, it is verified that sick leave affects
pay rise. Employees are penalized for being absent, even for low rates of sick leave. Sickness
absence in the interval 3 to 5% is estimated to reduce pay rise by around 1.4% relative to those
with less than 1% absence. Absence rates above 5% are predicted to be relatively penalized
by around 2% less extra pay rise. Moreover, sick leave seems to increase in the time before an
employee leaves the firm. This is taken as an evidence for moral hazard problems. However,
the results of other tests do not support a moral hazard interpretation.
Several of the questions addressed in this thesis can be related to the existing literature
on sick leave. Similar to this analysis, recent economic research on absenteeism has primarily
focused on financial incentives. Trends and changes in absenteeism are tried to be explained by
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possible rewards and penalties associated with sickness absence. Most of the work is empirical,
and the incentives which gained most interest were related to sickness insurance institutions
and employer responses. The next chapter will give a selected review of this literature.
The impact of sick pay systems is obviously necessary to assess. Insurance against the risk
of income loss under absence may clearly have an disincentive effect on attendance. This has
been verified several times, at least for Sweden (Johansson and Palme 1996, 2005). A less
generous sick pay system resulted in significantly lower sick leave rates. In Norway, however,
the public insurance system guarantees a replacement rate of normally 100% from the first
day of absence. In general, since this implies a strong disincentive for work, high absence rates
are predicted. Indeed, Norwegian sick leave rates are among the highest in Europe (Bonato
and Lusinyan 2004), but more striking is that the system is far from fully exploited.
Moreover, abuse of sick leave institutions appears actually to be easy. In Norway and
other countries, short absence spells are allowed to be self-certified. Basically based on trust,
employees can declare themselves to be incapable of work and stay at home. Together with
full income replacement, this seems at first view to be a free lunch. When absence involves no
cost and no monitoring, the incentive to attend at work for daily earnings deteriorates. Hence,
other incentives than those related to sickness insurance institutions must play an important
role as well. Otherwise the observed patterns remain unexplained. This is also one of the
reasons why this thesis is concerned with incentives provided at the firm level.
The workplace is certainly important for absence behavior. The employees’ sick leave is
likely to interrelated with rewards and penalties provided by employers. Absenteeism is costly
for firms. Work remains undone, and in several countries, including Norway, firms have to
cover the income replacement of shorter spells. Obviously, employers want to reduce sick
leave, and various forms of responses to higher sick leave are possible. Shirking might cause
dismissal, and individuals with high absence rates could be the first to be signed of in periods
of downsizing or be rejected permanent positions (Henningsen and Hægeland 2008, Ichino and
Riphahn 2005). However, such responses are harsh, and dismissals are often strongly regulated
by law. Such reactions are therefore less likely to observe.
Wage setting and promotions could be another disciplinary device used by firms in order to
contain absenteeism. At least wages are negotiated frequently and might thus be an applicable
mechanism of control. Employees with high sick leave rates could be penalized by receiving
lower pay rise and being refused promotion. Vice versa, employees with lower absence rates
may be rewarded with a wage increase. Hansen (2000) and Markussen (2009) suggest such
absence penalties imposed by firms, and this thesis postulates a similar relationship. The work
of Hansen and Markussen is thus comparable to this study, but methods and data differ. While
they use administrative data, this thesis estimates the relation between sick leave and earnings
directly at firm level employing personell data, including accurate measures of self-certified sick
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leave.
If pay rise is used as a disciplinary device, absence behavior may change when an employee
leaves the firm. When the employee quits anyway, the incentive to be present and receiving a
possibly higher pay rise vanishes. Whether such an effect exists or not will be tested in this
study. Moreover, any change in risk of being penalized could possibly have an effect. Ichino
and Riphahn (2005) postulated, for instance, that the end of probation possibly triggers higher
sick leave. This hypothesis is retested here by considering the effect of tenure. Whether start
or end of an individual’s occupational career is associated with different sick leave rates can
indicate possible moral hazard behavior. In addition, it also supports the theory that employers
are likely to penalize sickness absence through their wage setting.
The search for economic incentives related to absenteeism is performed by employing dif-
ferent statistical models. The possible relation between sick leave and pay rise is examined by
discrete choice and censored regression models. While logit models estimate the probability of
receiving a pay rise, tobit models estimate the size of the reward. Regarding absence behavior,
incidence and duration are considered. The influence of the variables mentioned above on
sick leave incidence is treated by logit models as well. Incidence is modeled as probability
of starting a new absence spell. Absence duration is treated by proportional hazard models.
Because duration models are less common in economics, a short introduction is given in the
chapter on the empirical strategy.
This analysis differs from many previous approaches by using personell data. The impact of
sick leave on earnings and the effect of other incentives can be examined directly. The personell
data is retrieved from a larger group of companies in Norway. Daily records of employees’ work
absence, together with data on pay rise, workplace and demographic characteristics, provides
a well-suited basis for analyzing individual absence behavior. The advantage of personell
data is that the individual decision to start and stop an absence spell can be studied directly.
The possible effect of incentives related to sick leave are examined on an individual level. In
addition, the measures of sick leave, including self-certified sick leave, are highly accurate.
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2. Sick leave in the economic literature
The effect of economic incentives on sick leave has been examined in numerous empirical and
theoretical studies. Economists began in earnest to be interested in absenteeism in the 1980s.
First, traditional labor market models were applied to explain absence behavior from a supply
side point of view. Later, also the role of the demand side was included in the analyses. The
responses to the cost of being absent for the employer and employee could then be considered
more integrated.
The cost of being absent is determined both directly through the sick pay scheme, if
existent, but also indirectly through responses of the employer. Both types of costs together
with their induced incentives are discussed in the literature. Several studies focus on the effect
of changes in the replacement rate on sick leave. A Swedish reform in the early nineties, which
allowed to identify the relation between economic incentives and absenteeism, was the point
of departure. Showing that a correlation between sick leave and its cost exists, these studies
concluded that sickness insurance institutions may be subject to moral hazard. Research
focusing on incentives at the firm level came to a similar conclusion.
2.1 Work absence and the labor market
The first economic studies of absenteeism looked at labor supply decisions under contractual
constraints and considered consequences for labor demand. The static neoclassical labor supply
model was the framework of choice for discussing an employee’s absence decision. Contrary, the
role of the production process was found to be critical for assessing the impact of absenteeism
for labor demand. Both directions of research assumed that work absence to some extent is
voluntary and that no income replacement is paid. Thus, absenteeism does not arise because
an employee is not capable of work, but because an employee chooses to be absent and abstains
from income. The terminology reflects this position. The terms sick leave or sickness absence
are rarely found in the early articles.
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2.1.1 Work absence and labor supply
Examples of studies focusing on labor supply are the empirical works by Allen (1981), and
Dunn and Youngblood (1986). These analyses treat work absence exclusively as a labor supply
decision on part of the worker. Deviation from contractual hours occurs when an employee’s
marginal utility of leisure exceeds the marginal wage. Work absence was seen as a mechanism
for approaching an optimal labor market equilibrium. In its most rigorous way, this argument
along contractual constraints is laid out in the theoretical work by Brown and Sessions (1996).
In order to test the optimal labor supply hypothesis, Allen (1981) estimates several absence
likelihood equations on a sample of workers with self-reported measures of days absent. He
finds that the wage level is negatively related to work absence. Those who have a higher wage,
and thus more to abstain, are less likely to be absent. The results are, however, questionable.
The wage effect is only significant in equations omitting personal and industrial characteristics.
Moreover, when Allen divides the data into blue collar and white collar subgroups, a wage effect
does only appear for blue collar workers, and only if accompanied by an insignificant dummy
variable describing whether sick leave is payable. On the other hand, some supportive evidence
for a negative correlation between wage rates and absence is also found by e. g. Chaudhury
and Ng (1992), and Drago and Wooden (1992)
Dunn and Youngblood (1986) construct a measure of the marginal rate of substitution of
income for leisure from survey data. This measure is employed in a tobit regression on the
absence frequency. A positive, slightly significant coefficient on the difference between wage
and the marginal rate of substitution is estimated. This estimated effect is taken as evidence
that work absence is a way of approaching an optimal labor market equilibrium. This is also
supported by the recent work of Barmby et al. (2002). Comparing sickness absence in different
countries, absence is positively correlated with higher usual hours of work. Higher hours of
work may be related to a higher marginal rate of substitution of income for leisure.
2.1.2 Work absence and labor demand
Labor supply may be interrelated with labor demand. Studying work absence without consid-
ering the demand side can therefore give misleading results. This was emphasized by Barmby
and Treble (1989, 1991). They suggest that a possible reason for the difficulty in interpreting
the empirical results regarding work absence and labor supply can be addressed to an identifi-
cation problem. High absence rates, may induce various reactions of the employer. Therefore,
when demand side effects are present, it can be difficult to disentangle their effect on work
absence from the effect of labor supply.
In one of the first economic analysis of work absence and labor demand, the role of the
production process is highlighted. Weiss (1985) argues that absenteeism is more costly for
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firms using an assembly-line type production. In such a production process a certain amount
of workers is needed to operate, and absence is obviously associated with a cost, even if no
replacement is paid. The expected marginal value of an employee decreases as the propensity
to be absent increases. Weiss postulates thus an efficiency wage type relationship for employees
working along an assembly line.
This argument is generalized by Coles and Treble (1993, 1996). They point out that when
employees are complements in production, work absence reduces productivity stronger, and
a firm may pay higher wages to reduce non-attendance. Hence, worker reliability requires a
wage premium. A trade off between wage costs and work absence arises, and depending on
the firm’s production technology different adaptions are possible. This may also provide an
explanation of some of the wage and absence rates variation observed in the labor market.
Another efficiency wage effect is highlighted by Carlin (1989) and Barmby et al. (1994).
In order to discourage absence, a firm may respond by monitoring. As monitoring is costly,
an optimal level of absence is defined. Thus, the firms permits an optimal amount of absence.
Barmby et al. (1994) show that an optimal response to increased monitoring cost may be
raising wages relative to sick pay.
2.2 The costs of absence and moral hazard
Sick leave is associated with costs. A sick pay scheme, which may be publicly or internally
regulated, sets a direct cost of being absent. The higher the replacement rate, the lower is
obviously the cost of being absent and the incentive to reduce sick leave decreases. Recent
research, especially on a Swedish reform in 1991, has confirmed that incentives resulting from
sick pay schemes are important.
On the other hand, many countries in Europe have a generous sickness insurance system
without experiencing high sick leave rates. See, for example, Barmby et al. (2002) and Bonato
and Lusinyan (2004) for an international comparison of work absence rates. Sickness insurance
systems are far from fully exploited. In particular, Germany has both a generous sickness
insurance system, but also low absence rates. Hence, other incentives to reduce absenteeism
may play a role as well, and economic research focused on the effect of sick leave on wages and
employment. Pay rise and employment may be disciplinary devices with respect to sickness
absence.
In the economic literature on absenteeism, the term moral hazard is often employed to sum-
marize the result that sick leave is influenced by economic incentives. In general, moral hazard
is defined as the phenomenon that individuals protected from risks may behave differently from
the way they would behave if fully exposed to the risks. In this context, moral hazard denotes
thus how individuals possibly would chance absence behavior if exposed differently to costs
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and risks associated with sick leave. Moral hazard means not that sick leave actually is abused,
but rather emphasizes the importance of economic incentives when considering absenteeism.
2.2.1 Incentives related to sick pay schemes
Barmby et al. (1991, 1995) were the first to examine how employees adjust their absence behav-
ior under a sick pay scheme. They analyze data of daily absence records at two manufacturing
plants operated by the same firm. The firm assigns three different grades conditional on the
number and types of absence records. Each worker’s sick pay rate is determined by these
grades. Using this data, Barmby et al. set up a Weibull duration model and a random effects
logit model and estimate how such a sick pay scheme affects absence behavior. Approaching a
lower grade seems to have a negative effect on absence duration. However, in the logit model
which estimates the probability of being absent, the revealed effects are hard to interpret.
While moving towards the second grade seems to have a disincentive effect on the probability
of being absent, approaching the third grade has no significant effect at all.
Several studies examine the effects of changes in the Swedish sickness insurance system.
In 1991, the replacement level of the compulsory sickness insurance was reduced markedly.
The replacement level was set from 90% to 65% of daily earnings for the first three days and
from 90% to 80% for the days four to 89. An insured employee could, however, still be absent
from work for up to eight successional days without a certificate from a physician. The reform
allowed researchers to identify directly economic incentives that affect work absence.
In the first article, Johansson and Palme (1996) use the exogenous reform effect to estimate
a demand function for absence by a count data regression model. Individual data on absence
behavior is aggregated over one year, and the variation in virtual income and the cost of being
absent is employed to estimate the effect of economic incentives on work absence. For the male
subsample, their results indicate a negative relationship between absence and its associated
cost. On the other hand, for the female subsample the relationship is positive. Virtual income
when a worker is absent has a negative effect.
Later, Johansson and Palme (2002, 2005) and Broström et al. (2002) get similar results.
They study work and absence spells by Kaplan-Meier techniques and different duration models.
Again, they show that the cost of being absent significantly affects works absence behavior.
The cost has a significant negative impact on the incidence, while impact on spell duration
appears to be weaker. The change in the pattern of the replacement rates is exploited. When
absent under the new regime, an individual has the choice of returning to work, and possibly
start a new spell, or continue being absent. When continuing, the individual gets a gradually
higher replacement rate from day four and day 90. Johansson and Palme (2005) show the
duration of spells longer than 90 days increased. These results are taken as an evidence for
moral hazard problems being present.
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Henrekson and Persson (2004) analyzes the effect of several Swedish sickness insurance
reforms using time series from 1955 to 1999. In this time period, numerous changes in the
compensation level were made. The Henrekson and Persson find that reforms entailing more
generous replacement rates for work absence can be associated with higher sick leave, and
vice versa. Interestingly, the impact of the 1991 reform is insignificant in their first regression.
Therefore, the authors examine a more narrow time period employing regional panel data
which gives significant effects with the expected sign. Thus, absence behavior seems to be
affected by changes in the sickness insurance system.
2.2.2 Incentives related to employer responses
While the analyses of changes in the Swedish sickness insurance system showed how sick leave
behavior significantly is influenced by economic incentives, the approaches could not explain
why generous sick pay schemes are not exploited to the full extent. Sick leave must be subject
to other incentives. Recent research proposes both earnings and unemployment to be affected
by sickness absence. Employers may respond to high absence rates by wage cuts or reduced
pay rise. Moreover, employees who are more absent could have less secure positions.
Two studies analyze the impact of sick leave on wages. Hansen (2000) investigates the
relation between short-term absences and wages using Mincer regressions. He argues that
short-term absence may signal the level of commitment to the job, and thus be related to the
wage level. In order to control for the effect of motivation, an instrument for absence duration
is constructed exploiting the Swedish 1991 reform. Hansen finds a significant negative effect
of days absent on women’s wage. One day of sick leave reduced the wage rate by 0.2%. On
the other hand, the relationship is insignificant for men.
Markussen (2009) employs Norwegian administrative data to estimate a relation between
sickness absence and earnings as well. Using an indicator of the physicians’ lenience as an
instrument for sick leave, Markussen controls in this manner for work motivation and health
status. He finds that one day of extra sickness absence reduces future earnings by 0.3%. In
addition, the first absence day has a negative impact on the wage of even 0.6%. In a restricted
sample, covering only full-time employed individuals, the cost of an extra absence day is
estimated to be 0.06%. These results are taken as evidence for a causal effect of sick leave on
earnings.
Hesselius (2007) examines whether sick leave influences the probability of becoming unem-
ployed. Similar to Hansen, he suggests that the utilization of sick leave implies a signaling
of productivity. Having more sick leave may therefore imply for an employee to be assessed
as less productive and more expensive. This may, in turn, lead to dismissal. Employment
duration is analyzed by a Cox proportional hazard model, and measures of absence duration
and incidence are included in the regression. The results indicate that a transition into unem-
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ployment appears to be significantly correlated with the number of sick leave spells and their
average length.
Another way of investigating whether unemployment is correlated with sick leave is to
consider the absence behavior over the business cycle. This is the approach of Askildsen et al.
(2005). They employ a fixed effects logit model on Norwegian administrative data to estimate
the probability of absence. First, their results indicate a negative impact of unemployment.
This impact becomes even stronger in a restricted sample, which covers only workers present
in the whole data period of six years. Therefore, Askildsen et al. conclude that the procyclical
variation in absenteeism is caused mainly by established workers, not by a different labor
force composition. This result can be interpreted as an evidence of moral hazard. Since those
individuals in the restricted sample are likely to be better insured against the risk of becoming
unemployed, they demand more sick leave.
Finally, the result that employment protection can have a negative impact on sick leave is
also found by Ichino and Riphahn (2005). They uses personnel data from an Italian bank to
estimate the effect of probation on absenteeism. In Italy, the end of probation is associated
with the begin of a strict firing protection. Controlling for individual and seasonal effects,
Ichino and Riphahn show that the end of probation has a significant effect on weekly days of
absence for both men and women. Particularly for men, the number of absence days increases
significantly. For men, the begin of strict firing protection is also the most likely break point
in the series of work absence. This test, however, fails for females. Nevertheless, the work
by Ichino and Riphahn shows in clear way that moral hazard behavior may occur in the sick
leave system.
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3. Data and institutions
3.1 The group of companies
This thesis considers personell data of a Norwegian group of companies situated in Oslo. The
group comprises 13 power and venture capital companies. The period of observation covers
five years, from 2004 until 2008. Not every company is observed for the whole period due to
merger and outsourcing. The group of companies has a monthly average of 892 employees. In
total, 1166 different employees are observed. The sizes of companies varies from having ten
until more than 200 employees. Roughly, one third of the employees are women.
Daily time records which count hours worked, overtime, sick leave etc. of each employee are
available. These time records can be employed to construct accurate sick leave rates and spell
patterns for each individual. In addition, there are monthly observations on earnings, tenure,
contractual working hours and demographic variables. Among other things, any possible pay
rise can be retrieved from this data.
3.1.1 Pay rise
In the group of companies, wages are bargained collectively and adjusted every year on given
dates, usually in June. Individual pay rises, however, on top of the collectively agreed rates
are possible and are realized together with the latter. Around one quarter of the employees
in the group receive such an individual wage increase. The collectively bargained rates are
known, while the exact additional individual increases are unknown. Since the individual and
collectively agreed part of the pay rises are realized jointly, they can easily be calculated. See
table 3.1 for some descriptive statistics on extra pay rise.
Table 3.1 gives also some descriptive statistics on the employees’ absence rates. The statis-
tics are calculated using the panel of preceding sick leave rates observed at each years wage
adjustment. Since this gives means, standard deviations and percentiles for individual ab-
sence behavior, the values differ from the absence statistics for the whole group. The average
monthly absence rate in the group of companies is 5.9% in the period of observation. The
physician-certified rate is 4.1%, and self-reported absence is 1.0%. A time series of monthly
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Table 3.1: Descriptive statistics
Mean Std. dev. 25% 50% 75%
Sick leave rate:
Total sick leave 0.051 0.109 0 0.012 0.045
Physician certified, 100% 0.034 0.093 0 0 0.022
Physician certified, graded 0.006 0.035 0 0 0
Self certified 0.011 0.016 0 0.003 0.016
Extra pay rise 0.027 0.057 0.004 0.011 0.28
Tenure in months 201.727 149.490 59 213 309
Overtime rate 0.027 0.049 0 0 0.034
Age 47.397 11.057 39 48 57
Parttime 0.09
Female 0.34
Means, standard errors and percentiles are calculated using all employee records in the period 2004 – 2008
observed at each years wage adjustment. The individual absence and overtime rates are calculated for the
periods between wage adjustments.
absence rates is given in figure 3.1.1.
3.2 Sickness insurance institutions
Sick leave can either be self-certified or physician-certified. Both absence types are present in
the data. In the group of companies under study, spells of self-certified sick leave can last up
to eight successional days. However, the sum of self-certified sick days cannot exceed 24 days
within 12 months, and after eight absence days, single or successional, an employee must be
present for at least 16 days before self-certification is again allowed.1 Each employee is entitled
to use self-certification after two months of tenure.
Contrary, there are no limits regarding physician-certified spells. Physician-certified ab-
sence may be 100% with respect to contracted working hours or graded, i. e. less than full-time
Graded sick leave denotes a combination of part-time working and sick leave. In general, indi-
viduals with long-lasting or recurrent diseases, who are capable of work, though not fulltime,
are on this type of sick leave. Because precise starting dates are not given, its duration and
scope are hard to identify, and graded sick leave is ignored in this thesis. Moreover, graded
sick leave accounts for only a small fraction of total sickness absence, see table 3.1. Transitions
from self-certified spells to physician-certified spells of both kinds may occur.
In Norway, the replacement ratio is normally 100% from the first day of absence, irrespec-
tive of the type of sick leave. This is covered by the employers in the first 16 days, after wich
1In the group of companies, the right to use self-certification is extended compared to the law-regulated stan-
dard of maximum three days and four spells within twelve months. This is due to the companies participation
in an intervention program aimed at reducing sick leave and increasing the average retirement age.
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Figure 3.1: Time series of sick leave rates in the group of companies
the social security system pays the replacement up to a ceiling of around 400.000 NOK (in
2008), while employers in many cases add the amount necesary to ensure full replacement.
This also applies for the group of companies under study. The maximum duration of sickness
benefits is one year. After this period an individual must either go back to work or participate
in a rehabilitation program. However, in data available, all uncensored sick leaves spells are
less than a year.
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4. Empirical strategy
Three aspects of sick leave and its relation to variables of interest are considered. In the
first section, several approaches for modeling the relation between pay rise and sick leave
are discussed. Then, in the second section, various ways of modeling the possible relation
between the incidence of absence and some explanatory variables are examined. Finally, a
short introduction on duration models is given. These models are employed to focus on the
length of sick leave spells. The results of estimation are presented in the next chapter.
4.1 Pay rise and sick leave
Each year, together with the collectively agreed wage increase, the employees can receive an
additional pay rise. This extra pay rise is negotiated individually. The probability of receiving
such a pay rise can be considered using logistic regression. Since the size of the extra pay rise
is known, it can alternatively be examined by a censored regression model.
4.1.1 Logit models
In order to test the hypothesis that there is a link between sick leave and pay rise, a first
approach may be to divide the workers into two different groups depending on whether or
not they get an additional individual pay rise. For convenience, call them winners or looser,
indicated by 1 and 0. Individual sick leave rates in the periods between wages are renegotiated
are taken as a measure of absence.
A logit model is applied to estimate the probability of belonging to the group of winners,
Yit = 1{β′xit+it>0}, Pr(Yit = 1|xit) =
eβ
′xit
1 + eβ′xit
. (4.1)
As explanatory variables, xit, four categorical dummies representing different sick leave
rates and several control variables are employed. Having less than 1% sick leave is taken as
a reference category. In general, due to the danger of parametric mispecification, all continu-
ous variables are rather represented by categories which allow for nonlinear relationships. As
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controls, categorical dummies for wage level, tenure, overtime rate and age are included, in
addition to single dummies for company, year, sex and part-time. The wage level is repre-
sented by four company-specific wage quantiles with the first quantile as reference category.
These quantiles have been calculated for each period before a possible pay rise is realized. By
representing the wage levels in this way, they become comparable through time.
Wage quantiles are included in the regression in order to control for the possible effect that
high-paid employees not only are less sick but also receive more pay rise. Tenure is important
because newly-employed individuals may be considerably different from those who are tied to
the companies for a longer time. For example, receiving a pay rise in the first year is unlikely,
but sick leave may be extraordinary low under probation as well. Therefore, four tenure-
interval dummies are added. Overtime rates have also to be taken into consideration. High
overtime rates can cause both frequent sickness absence and pay rise. Furthermore, working
part-time may be associated with less frequent extra pay rise, while the employees’ health
status could vary from those working full-time. Since sick leave rates vary substantially over
age and sex, nine age-interval dummies and a dummy for females are included. Finally, sick
leave rates and pay rise also vary over companies and years. Therefore, ten company dummies
and four year dummies are included in the model.
The data set is an unbalanced panel. Due to hiring and dismissal, not every worker
i = 1, . . . , n is present in the sample period t = 2004, . . . , 2008. However, it is important to
recognize the panel structure and take it into account. In general, the panel structure would
require to specify the intragroup disturbances it and is to be freely correlated, whereas
disturbances across groups are assumed uncorrelated. This problem can, in principal, be
solved by an effects model. Such a model respecifies the disturbance as it = ui + vit, where
unobserved individual-specific effects are captured by the term ui. Depending on whether or
not the individual heterogeneity ui is correlated with some of the explanatory variables, a fixed
or random effects model can be applied, see e. g. Greene (2003, chap. 21.5) for a discussion on
effects models.
Low work motivation, for instance, is unobserved and may cause both higher absence rates
and no extra pay rise. As a consequence of not controlling for motivation, the estimator may
be biased and inconsistent. Given that motivation is constant over time, employing a fixed
effects logit model could solve the problem. It estimates a fixed motivation parameter for
each employee. However, the fixed effects logit model has some major shortcomings as, among
others, pointed out by Wooldridge (2002, chap. 15.8). Since the estimator relies on estimating
a constant for each employee with only a few observations, these individual-effects estimators
are inconsistent. The estimator for the coefficients relies on these inconsistent estimators and
will be inconsistent as well. This problem is usually denoted as the incidental parameter
problem with reference to Neyman and Scott (1948).
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The log-likelihood function for the fixed effects model is
` =
n∑
i=1
Ti∑
t=1
log Pr(Yit = 1|ui + β′xit), (4.2)
where Pr(Yit = 1|ui + β′xit) is defined analogously to eq. (4.1).
A fixed effects model can only identify the effect of variables that change within individuals.
Variables that do not vary within individuals can statistically not be separated from the
individual-specific effect ui. Hence, the impact of sex on pay rise cannot be estimated. In
addition, a problem between pay rise and the wage quantiles arises. As wages are downward
rigid, moving to a higher wage quantile is caused by extra pay rise. A downward movement
is likely to occur when not receiving a pay rise. It is easier to move upwards, when in the
lower quantiles, but more difficult in the third and impossible in the fourth quantile. For
downward movements, it is the other way round. Since only those individuals who move
between categories contribute in the fixed effects model, the higher quantiles will be biased
negatively and the lower quantiles positively.
This problem do not occur in the random effects model. The random model treats indi-
vidual heterogeneity as a random variable drawn from known distribution, usually the normal
distribution. Using this approach, there is no problem related to incidental parameters, but
none of the explanatory variables can be correlated with ui. This is a strong assumption
which easily fails to be met, e. g. if work motivation affects sick leave as suggested above. On
the other hand, if the underlying assumptions of the random effects model are satisfied, the
estimator is consistent and efficient.
The log-likelihood function for each individuals Ti observations is
`i =
∫ +∞
−∞
[
Ti∑
t=1
Pr(Yit = yit|ui + β′xit)
]
f(ui)dui, (4.3)
where f(ui) denotes the density function of the random heterogeneity term.
Results for the effect of total sick leave on extra pay rise can be found in table 5.1. Table 5.2
displays the estimation results for models substituting total sick leave with physician-certified
and self-certified sick leave, respectively.
4.1.2 Tobit models
The binary model above neglects the information that is contained in the different levels of
additional pay rise. For example, as a consequence of being more absent than other employees,
pay rise may be lower, but not zero. Incorporating such information can be done by employing
a tobit model. The lower limit for the individual pay rise is zero. Thus, it is a limited dependent
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variable, continuous for positive values, but censored at zero. The ordinary least squares
estimator would be biased in this case, whereas the tobit estimator handles the censoring. In
general, the tobit model can be written as
yit =
β′xit + it if β′xit + it > 00 if β′xit + it ≤ 0, (4.4)
where yit now denotes the left-censored variable. Let each it be independent normally dis-
tributed with variance σ. The likelihood function for each observation is then given by
Lit =

φ((yit−β′xit)/σ)
σ if yit > 0
1− Φ
(
β′xit
σ
)
if yit = 0.
(4.5)
For each nonlimit observation, the likelihood is the height of the density representing the
probability of obtaining this observation. For each censored observation, the likelihood is
equals the probability of getting an observation below or equal the zero limit.
A random effects tobit model is easily implemented, and allows for intragroup correlation
of the disturbance it = ui + vit. The same strong exogeneity assumption on ui as in the logit
case apply. A fixed effects estimator, however, is not available for tobit models in common
statistical packages. Greene (2004) shows that also this fixed effects estimator suffers from a
similar bias as in the logit case. The estimation results for the tobit model can be found in
table 5.1 and 5.2.
4.2 Sick leave incidence
One way of looking at the incidence of sickness spells and their relation to variables of interest,
is to model the probability of starting a new spell. Conditional on attendance the previous
recorded working day, such a probability model can be estimated by similar logit models as
in the section above. Binomial logit models are used to examine the probability of starting
any kind of sickness absence, whereas a multinomial logit model is employed to consider the
choice between physician-certified and self-certified sick leave.
4.2.1 Logit models
Being absent or not is a binary outcome which may be fitted by an logistic regression. Ex-
planatory variables are categorical dummies for wage quantiles, tenure and the time before
quit, in addition to some control variables. The controls for age and company are identical
with those included in the logit and tobit models of extra pay rise.
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The wage quantiles are also constructed identically. Due full income replacement under
absence it is assumed that there is no direct relationship between the wage level and sick leave.
Company-dependent wage quantiles may however serve as proxies for different types of jobs
and the employees’ position in the organizational hierarchy. Tenure and time before quit are
added to the regression in order to inspect if there exist a moral hazard problem related to
the period of probation or the period before leaving the company. for some unknown reason.
Two intervals of the time before quit are included in the model, twelve to six months and
six or less months. More than twelve months is the base category. In general, those who leave
can be more sick than others, but it may be unlikely that such a selection is present only in the
last six months. If individuals who quit on average have another health status, it is expected
to be revealed in both time intervals. In addition, eleven age-interval dummies control for
any age-specific effects that may appear, as many leave due to retirement. Furthermore, if
most of the employees quit at a specific point in time, for instance in June, the quit variables
could wrongfully capture a calendar time effect. Thus, dummies for calendar months must be
included, otherwise the results could be biased. The estimation results for the logit models
can be found in table 5.3
4.2.2 Multinomial logit models
When starting a new sick leave spell, an employee has the choice between self-certification and
obtaining a medical certificate from a physician. Contrary to the binary choice between work
attendance and sick leave, this is a situation with several choices which can be modeled using
a multinomial logit model. Let 1 denote physician-certified absence, while 2 denotes the choice
of self-certified sick leave. Naturally, the base category, 0, is no absence. The probability of
choosing alternative j = 0, 1, 2 is modeled as
P0it = Pr(Yit = 0|xit) = 1
1 + eβ′1xit + eβ′2xit
,
Pkit = Pr(Yit = j|xit) = e
β′jxit
1 + eβ′1xit + eβ′2xit
, k = 1, 2.
(4.6)
It is important to include a constant term in the vector of coefficients βj , otherwise the logit
model is subject to an important restriction called independence from irrelevant alternatives.
Basically, in multinomial logit models, all probability ratios such as P1it/P0it = exp(β′jxit)
are independent from other choice alternatives. In this case, this seems unrealistic because
self-certified and physician-certified sick leave may be close substitutes. By adding a constant
term, however, the estimation procedure will come up with a value so that the probabilities
do not exhibit this restriction (Train 1986). The log-likelihood function for the multinomial
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logit model is just a generalization of that for the binomial logit model,
` =
n∑
i=1
J∑
j=0
log Pr(Yit = 1|ui + β′xit). (4.7)
Effects models for the multinomial logit which account for the panel structure of the data
are not available or computational challenging. While a fixed effects variant does not seem
to be existent, at least not in most standard statistical software packages, a random effects
model is not possible to fit within a reasonable amount of time. Hence, only a model without
individual effects is fitted. Results from maximum likelihood estimation are found in table 5.3.
4.3 Sick leave duration
Another way of looking at sick leave, is to consider the length of spells. Duration models can
be employed to examine whether sick leave duration is related to the same variables of interest
considered in the the section above.
4.3.1 Basics concepts and notation
Let T be a positive random variable representing absence duration. T is also known as survival
time. It has cumulative density F (t) = Pr(T ≤ t), and its probability density function is
f(t) = dF (t)/dt. The complement of the cumulative density function, F¯ (t) = 1 − F (t), is
called survival function. The survival function gives the probability that the spell is at least
of duration t. The probability that a spell ends in the next short interval ∆t, given that it has
lasted until time t can be characterized by the hazard rate. It is defined as
λ(t) ≡ lim
∆t→0+
Pr(T ∈ [t, t+ ∆t)|T ≥ t)
∆t
. (4.8)
λ(t) can be interpreted as the rate at which spells are completed after duration t, given
that the spell lasts at least until t. The hazard rate can also be expressed in terms of the
distribution functions and survival function, and vice versa,
λ(t) =
f(t)
1− F (t) = −
d log(1− F (t))
dt
= −d log(F¯ (t))
dt
⇔
F¯ (t) = exp
(
−
∫ t
0
λ(u)du
)
, t ≥ 0.
Since the hazard function generally is more interesting for the analysis than the survival
function, it is normally this part which is modeled directly.
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4.3.2 Proportional hazards models
Several functional forms for the hazard have been suggested, e. g. exponential, Weibull and
lognormal.1 In particular, the first two specifications are part of the popular proportional
hazard family, and it is assumed that the hazard has a functional form of this family. In
general, a proportional hazard model is described by
λ(t|x) = λ0(t) exp(β′x), (4.9)
where λ0(t) is called baseline hazard. It determines the shape of the hazard function, while
exp(β′x) scales it. This implies that only the level of the hazard function is allowed to differ
across observations, and absolute differences in x imply proportionate differences in in the
hazard at each t. Hence, its name. The parametrization λ0(t) = αtα−1, α > 0, gives the
Weibull model.
However, different parametric specifications of the hazard give different estimators and
possibly misleading results when choosing the wrong form. Therefore, rather than assuming a
specific parametrization for λ(t), a semiparametric approach has become popular. Cox (1972)
introduced a hazard model where the baseline hazard is left unspecified and showed that the
effect of the explanatory variables could be estimated by partial likelihood.
Let there be K distinct end times. At each of those time points Tk, let Rk be the set of
individuals who have not yet ended their spell, while Dk is the set of dk individuals who exit.
The probability of the latter, conditional on the risk set Rk, is
Pk =
∏
i∈Dk exp(β
′xi)[∑
i∈Rk exp(xi)
]dk , (4.10)
where the baseline hazard cancels out due to the conditioning. The log-likelihood can now be
written as
` =
K∑
k=1
∑ i ∈ Dkβ′xi − dk log
∑
i∈Rk
exp(xi)
 (4.11)
Results from maximum likelihood estimation of the semiparametric Cox model can be
found in table 5.4.
4.3.3 Unobserved heterogeneity
If all differences among individuals are captured by the observed explanatory variables, no
unobserved heterogeneity is present. This may be unlikely, and Lancaster (1979) and Vaupel
1See e. g. Greene (2003, chap. 22.5) and Kiefer (1988) for an overview.
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et al. (1979) introduced for this reason a stochastic heterogeneity variable in the proportional
hazard model. First, wrongfully ignoring unknown heterogeneity over-estimates negative du-
ration dependence, because subjects with high individual-specific hazards will complete spells
faster. Positive-duration dependence is analogously under-estimated. Second, failure to con-
trol for unobserved heterogeneity can produce severe bias in the estimates on the explanatory
variables. The proportionate response of the hazard to variation in each regressor at any
duration is weakened (Lancaster 1990, chap. 4).
Let all unobservable heterogeneity be captured by the random variable V , and let its
particular realization v enter multiplicatively into eq. (4.9) as the other terms, so that
λ(t,x|v) = λ0(t) exp(β′x)v. (4.12)
Unobserved heterogeneity is either assumed to follow a parametric distribution or it is specified
nonparametrically as by . Eq.(4.12) is referred to as a mixed proportional hazard model. In
table (5.4), estimation results can be found for the parametric Weibull model. The random
effects Weibull model is calculated assuming that heterogeneity follows a gamma distribution.
See e. g. Gutierrez (2002) for a formal derivation of the maximum likelihood estimator.
4.3.4 Discrete time models
Under the proportional hazard assumption, a discretization of the time scale allows for easy
methods for estimating flexible hazard functions (Jenkins 1995). This discretization is not
inconsistent with an underlying continuous process. A discrete time proportional hazard model
was originally introduced by Kalbfleisch and Prentice (1973) and Prentice and Gloeckler (1978),
and later extended by Meyer (1990) and Han and Hausman (1990).
Suppose durations are only observed in T disjoint time intervals of equal length. Let the
t’th interval be defined as [t, t + 1). The discrete time (interval) hazard is defined as the
probability that a spell is completed in the interval ending before t+1, given that it has lasted
until t, i. e. λt = Pr(T < t+ 1|T ≥ t, v). Using the survival function, the interval hazard can
be written as
λt = 1− F¯ (t|v)/F¯ (t+ 1|v)
= 1− exp
[
−
∫ t+1
t
λ(τ |v)dτ
]
(4.13)
If the underlying continuous hazard λ(t) is assumed to belong to the mixed proportional
hazard class, as specified by eq. (4.12), and is integrable, then eq. (4.13) can be rewritten.
Furthermore, if the explanatory variables are assumed to be constant within intervals, this
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yields
λt = 1− exp
[
−v exp(β′xt)
∫ t+1
t
λ0(τ)dτ
]
= 1− exp [− exp(u+ β′xt + γt)] , (4.14)
where γt ≡ log
∫ t+1
t λ0(τ)dτ and u ≡ log(v). Such a specification of the discrete hazard rate
is also called cloglog model. Alternatively, eq. (4.14) can be rewritten as
log(− log[1− λt]) = u+ β′xt + γt, (4.15)
which is known as an complementary log-log transformation.
In general, the distribution of u among individuals is unknown. Therefore, in order to
account for unobserved heterogeneity, it is often assumed that u follows a normal or gamma
distribution with mean one. Meyer (1990), for instance, employs the model above by assuming
a gamma distribution for u. See table 5.4 for results from maximum likelihood estimation of
a cloglog model with normal random effects. The construction of the likelihood equation
is shown many in textbooks on generalized linear models2, for example Skrondal and Rabe-
Hesketh (2004).
2The cloglog model with random effects is a generalized linear mixed model belonging to the binomial family
with cloglog link function.
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5. Results
Following the same structure as the previous chapter on the empirical strategy, the results
concerning sick leave and pay rise are considered first. Thereafter follow the results and
discussion of the models on the probability of starting a new sick leave spell. Finally, the
estimates of the duration models are presented.
5.1 Sick leave and pay rise
The effect of sick leave on extra pay rise is examined by logit and tobit models. The results
are displayed in table 5.1 and 5.2. Table 5.1 shows estimates on the effect of total sick leave,
while table 5.2 shows estimates on the effect of physician-certified and self-certified absence,
respectively.
5.1.1 Total sick leave
Consider first the impact of total sick leave on individual pay rise. The estimates of the simple
logit model without individual heterogeneity clearly suggest an effect of total sick leave on pay
rise. All categories for sick leave have negative coefficients and these become stronger both in
size and significance the higher the absence rate. At 3 to 5% sick leave, the impact becomes
statistically significant at a 5% level. For example, an average male employee in the largest
company and in the second wage quantile would have a probability of 32.2% of getting a pay
rise in 2007 if his sick leave stayed below 1%. Increasing his sick leave to the category 5 to 7%,
reduces the probability to 21.0%. It is 19.7% if the rate is higher than 7%.
The same effect seems also to be present in the fixed effects variant of the logit model. The
coefficients have the same sign and similar size. The impact of sick leave on extra pay rise
appears thus not to be seriously biased due to individual heterogeneity. Unobservable effects
such as work motivation seem to have less importance if assumed constant over time. However,
except for the coefficient on the highest sick leave rate, none of the coefficients are significant
on a 5% level. Such a reduction in significance could be expected. First, because the sample
size is almost halved. In addition, recover that in the fixed effects model only those individuals
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Table 5.1: Determinants of extra pay rise
Logit model 1 Logit model 2 Tobit model
Sick leave rate:
0.00 – 0.01
0.01 – 0.03 −0.0380 (0.1127) −0.0754 (0.1568) −0.0092∗ (0.0038)
0.03 – 0.05 −0.3472∗ (0.1494) −0.3401 (0.2139) −0.0143∗∗ (0.0055)
0.05 – 0.07 −0.5787∗∗ (0.2016) −0.4936 (0.2675) −0.0200∗ (0.0080)
0.07 + −0.6479∗∗∗ (0.1374) −0.5720∗∗ (0.2109) −0.0214∗∗∗ (0.0053)
Wage quantiles:
1st quantile
2nd quantile −0.4574∗∗∗ (0.1204) −0.0159∗∗ (0.0053)
3rd quantile −0.4693∗∗∗ (0.1204) −0.0152∗∗ (0.0054)
4th quantile −0.9964∗∗∗ (0.1371) −0.0318∗∗∗ (0.0080)
Tenure:
0 – 1 year −0.9896∗∗∗ (0.2076) −0.2615 (0.8643) −0.0157 (0.0086)
1 – 3 years 0.3651∗ (0.1759) 0.8581 (0.7851) 0.0204∗∗ (0.0067)
3 – 5 years 0.4777∗∗ (0.1797) 0.6590 (0.7077) 0.0205∗∗ (0.0069)
5 – 10 years 0.1041 (0.1413) 0.0957 (0.6139) 0.0095 (0.0054)
10 + years
Overtime rate:
no overtime
0 – 0.02 0.0530 (0.1278) −0.1445 (0.1916) −0.0030 (0.0047)
0.02 + 0.5119∗∗∗ (0.1043) 0.4566∗ (0.2011) 0.0098∗∗ (0.0037)
Part time −0.3153∗ (0.1525) −1.0228 (0.6653) −0.0092 (0.0055)
Female 0.0299 (0.1081) 0.0036 (0.0043)
Individual effects No effects Fixed effects No effects
Log likelihood -1685.150 -637.575 540.926
Observations 3043 1795 3043
uncensored 1052
* p < 0.05, ** p< 0.01, *** p< 0.001. Standard errors in parenthesis. Robust standard errors allowing for
correlation within individuals are reported in the tobit model. The logit models estimate the probability
of getting an extra pay rise, while the tobit model takes extra pay rise, censored at zero, as left-hand
side variable. Additional control variables, not displayed above, are nine categorical dummies for age,
ten dummies for company, year dummies and a constant. Sick leave rates are calculated for the period
between each years wage adjustment. Furthermore, wage quantiles are company dependent. Random
effects models give essentially the same estimates as the respective models without effects. Logit employed
on the subsample from the fixed effects model gives similar results compared to estimation on the whole
sample.
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who change categories contribute in estimation. At lower sick leave rates, individuals do not
changes categories often.
A random effects model gives essentially the same estimates on sick leave as the model
without effects. A Hausman test, however, rejects the possibly efficient random effects model
over the fixed effects model. On the other hand, this test assumes the fixed effect estimator
to be consistent. This consistency assumption is somewhat problematic as discussed above.
Nevertheless, only the fixed effects model can capture unobservable heterogeneity which is
correlated with some the explanatory variables. For this reason, the fixed effect model is
favored and displayed in table 5.1. At least for the sick leave rates, the fixed effect variant of
the logit model gives some evidence that unobservable individual heterogeneity is not a serious
problem. Hence, unobservable motivation effects, which could have been correlated with both
sick leave and pay rise, appear not to bias the impact of sick leave on additional pay rise.
The negative impact of sick leave on pay rise is even clearer in the tobit model. The
estimated coefficients in the tobit model have also direct interpretation. While in the previous
models the data is fitted to a nonlinear logistic curve, the tobit model is linear for all positive
pay rises, but censored at zero. Thus, for all positive values, i. e. realized wage increases, its
interpretation is similar to a linear regression model. For example, having a sick leave rate of
5 to 7% gives a 2% lower individual pay rise. A sick leave rate above 7% reduces pay rise by
2.14%. When an employee should have received the mean pay rise of 2.7%, being more than
5% absent is predicted to almost elapse this extra pay rise. The effects are significant, even at
the lowest level of absence, 1 to 3%, where an almost 1% pay rise reduction is estimated.
A random effects tobit model gives statistically identical estimates of the impact of sick
leave. However, the logit models indicate that there is no strong heterogeneity bias on absence
rates. A simple tobit model seems therefore appropriate. In addition, standard errors are
chosen to be robust with respect to correlation within individuals.
Finally, these findings can also be related to some of the results in the contemporary
economic literature on sick leave. Recently, both Hansen (2000) and Markussen (2009) have
assessed the impact of sickness absence on earnings. Recover that, Hansen estimated, though
only for females, a significant reduction of the the wage rate by 0.2% for each day of absence.
Markussen shows that future earnings on average are reduced by 0.6% the first day and by
0.3% each following day. This study suggests, at least for low absence rates, similar reductions.
For example, seven days of sick leave equal approximately an absence rate of 3%. While
Hansen and this study then predict a reduction of 1.4% for seven absence days, Markussen
estimates an average reduction of 2.4%. Similarly, an absence rate of 6% is estimated to reduce
future earnings by 2% in this study and by 2.8% in Hansen’s analysis. Markussen (2009), on
the other hand, predicts the reduction to be even 4.5%. Hence, for low sick leave rates which
are representative for most employees, these three studies are comparable.
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5.1.2 Other covariates
Although the primary focus is on the relation between sick leave and pay rise, other interesting
observations can be made on the estimated models. Both the simple logit model and the tobit
model reveal that the wage level is important for additional wage increase. The estimated
pattern is striking. The higher the wage level, the lower is the probability of receiving an
extra pay rise. The tobit model predicts that an individual in the second and third quantile
will get on average 1.59% and 1.52% lower pay rise, respectively. At the highest wage levels,
additional pay rise is on average reduced by 3.18%.
These results are controlled for tenure and age, so it seems that the wage policy of the group
of companies has an equalizing profile. Whether this is intended or not remains questionable.
An alternative explanation may be that the employer cares about the total cost of extra pay
rise. Each employee’s pay rise is considered in percentage, and the total cost for the companies
depends thus on the employees previous wage levels. Distributing more pay rises to those in
the higher wage quantiles is more costly than favoring those in the lower quantiles. Hence, if
the group of companies is concerned about the total cost of the additional pay rises, there is
an incentive to distribute more of the pay rises to the lower quantiles.
The effect of tenure on additional pay rise is somewhat as expected. The results show that
it is unlikely that a newly-employed individual receives a pay rise. The simple logit model
shows a strong negative effect in the first year of work. Also the random effects model and the
tobit model estimate a negative impact. However, the coefficient is not significant at a 5% level,
and in the logit model with random effects the coefficient is much lower. The latter indicates
that unobservable heterogeneity with respect to the effect of tenure may be important.
For the second until the fifth year, the tobit model estimates an extra pay rise of about
2.5%. Also the logit model without individual effects predicts a higher probability of receiving
a wage increase. The random effects model proposes somewhat stronger, though insignificant,
effects. These results suggest that the first years after probation are important for additional
pay rise. The wage-tenure curve seems to be steep in the beginning, while it becomes more
flat after five years.
5.1.3 Physician-certified and self-certified sick leave
In table 5.2, the estimated effects of physician-certified and self-certified absence are displayed.
Analogous models as above have been fitted to the data with total sick leave substituted
with the two sick leave types, respectively. The estimates on the other covariates are almost
identical to the results from table 5.1. For this reason, these estimates are not displayed in
table 5.2.
Physician-certified sick leave appears to reduce individual pay rise, at least if above 5%.
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Table 5.2: The effect of physician-certified and self-certified sick leave on pay rise
Logit model 1 Logit model 2 Tobit model
Physician-certified
sick leave rate
0.01 – 0.03 −0.1241 (0.1627) −0.0838 (0.2134) −0.0060 (0.0050)
0.03 – 0.05 −0.3249 (0.1919) −0.2410 (0.2705) −0.0113 (0.0070)
0.05 + −0.6221∗∗∗ (0.1305) −0.5188∗∗ (0.1818) −0.0169∗∗∗ (0.0050)
Self-certified
sick leave rate
0.01 – 0.02 −0.0701 (0.1130) −0.0654 (0.1538) −0.0085∗ (0.0041)
0.02 – 0.03 −0.2308 (0.1622) 0.0875 (0.2323) −0.0133∗ (0.0060)
0.03 + −0.3483∗ (0.1486) 0.2454 (0.2248) −0.0148∗ (0.0067)
Individual effects No effects Fixed effects No effects
Observations 3043 1795 3043
uncensored 1052
* p < 0.05, ** p< 0.01, *** p< 0.001 and standard errors in parenthesis. Robust standard errors allowing
for correlation within individuals are reported in the tobit model. The effect of the physician-certified and
self-certified sick leave rate on extra pay rise has been estimated separately. The models are analogous
to the model reported in table (5.1) and control variables are identical. Logit on the subsample from the
fixed effect model gives clearly different estimated coefficients for self-certified sick leave than for the whole
sample, while they are almost identical for physician-certified sick leave.
The estimated coefficients on lower rates have the expected sign and decrease as expected with
higher absence rates. The coefficients are, however, not different from zero at a 5% level of
significance. The picture is similar for all three models, and the results from the fixed effect
model are similar to the logit model without any individual heterogeneity. The latter indicates
again that it not erroneous to stick to models without individual effects. On the other hand,
the fixed effects model shows how robust the result related to 5% absence is.
The size of the effect can be illustrated by looking at the changes in probability. The simple
logit model estimates that going from 1% or less to more than 5% absence, the probability of
receiving a pay rise in 2007 decreases from 31.0% to 19.4% for an average male employee in
the largest company having a wage in the second quantile. The tobit model, which estimates
the reduction directly, predicts that the employee’s extra pay rise escaped with 1.69%.
For self-certified sick leave, a more complicated picture emerges. In the logit model with-
out individual effects, the estimated coefficients have the expected sign and decrease with
higher sick leave. However, only the highest rates, more than 3%, are statistically significant.
Contrary, the estimates of the fixed effects model are peculiar. Although far from significant,
higher self-certified sick leave rates appear to be positively correlated with pay rise.1 On the
1A possible explanation may be that the reduced fixed effect sample is too different from the original data.
This seems to be confirmed when the reduced sample is employed in a simple logit model. The resulting
estimates on subsample are very different from the estimates on the whole sample.
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other hand, the results from the tobit model support the hypothesis that employees are pun-
ished for being absent, especially if self-certified. Using robust standard errors, all rates are
significant and decreasing with higher self-certified absence. For example, having more than
3% sick leave without a medical certificate is estimated to reduce individual pay rise by 1.48%.
Note that the assessed sick leave rate intervals are different in the two models. Since the
average physician-certified sick leave rate is higher than the average rate for self-certified sick
leave, it also requires wider categories compromising higher absence rates. Comparing the two
models in table 5.2 uncovers thus a remarkable pattern. While documented sickness absence is
significantly penalized first if above 5%, self-certified absence is found to be penalized already
at 1%. According to the tobit models, a physician-certified absence rate between 1 and 3%
cuts definitely not an extra pay rise, while a self-certified rate in the same interval apparently
does. Since self-certification is more vulnerable to abuse than physician-certified absence, the
result that undocumented sickness absence is penalized harder by withholding extra pay rise
may not be surprising.
To sum up, sick leave has obviously a negative impact on the probability of receiving an
additional pay rise. The higher the sick leave, the lower is the predicted probability, and
the lower is the realized extra wage increase, if any. Unobserved heterogeneity seems not to
affect this result. Moreover, the sick leave type does matter. Self-certified absence is penalized
at lower levels than physician-certified sick leave. Both results indicate that the group of
companies, intentional or not, employs extra pay rise as an incentive mechanism to reduce sick
leave.
5.2 Sick leave incidence
The incidence of sickness absence is studied by modeling the probability of starting a new
spell. Logit models are applied, and the results can be found in table 5.3. The probability
of starting any kind of spell, physician-certified or self-certified, is modeled by binomial logit
models with and without individual effects. The results of the simple logit model which not
accounts for individual heterogeneity are displayed in the first column. The results of the fixed
effects variant are given in the second column.
According to a Hausman test, the random effects logit model is found to be statistically
not identical to the fixed effects model. In this case, the fixed effects model is considered
as consistent and efficient, and thus preferred over the non-consistent random effects variant.
However, the same irresolvable consistency problem with respect to the fixed effect logit esti-
mator as mentioned above arises. On the other hand, many observations for each individual
will strengthen the consistency of the fixed effects estimator.
The probability of choosing a specific kind of spell is examined by a multinomial logit
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model. In the third column in table 5.3, the estimated coefficients and its standard errors
for physician-certified absence are displayed, while the fourth column shows the same for self-
certified absence. An effects model could due to computational constraints not be fitted within
a reasonable time.
5.2.1 Wage level
Consider the simple logit model without individual heterogeneity displayed in the first column
in table 5.3. As in the previous models, the first company-dependent wage quantile is taken as
a reference category. At first view, the relation between wage and the probability of starting
a new spell appears intricate to explain. While the probability increases significantly in the
second wage quantile, it decreases in the fourth quantile by almost the same amount. The
impact of the third wage quantile is statistically not different from the first. Hence, the effect
of the wage level appears to be nonlinear, hardly explained by a single or an unidirectional
effect.
The wage level is expected to have no direct impact on the probability of starting a new
absence spell. In general, as the replacement ratio in Norway is 100% from the first day of
absence, the employees do not face a direct financial loss linked to their wage level when
on sick leave. In the previous section, however, it is claimed that sick leave is penalized by
receiving lower pay rise. If the utility function is concave over income, a marginal pay rise
will result in higher utility gains in the lower wage quantiles than in the upper quantiles. The
incentives to reduce sick leave incidence should therefore be higher at lower wage levels. This
can explain why the probability of starting a spell rises in the second quantile. On the other
hand, the reason why wage levels above the median appears to be negativly correlated with
spell incidence remains unexplained.
Employees having higher wage levels may be substantially different from those receiving
less wage. A selection mechanism can be easily set up. Generally, high wage levels are
associated with specific job types, promotions and, of course, extra pay rise. The latter is
already being seen to be partly determined by the sick leave rate, and it is not unlikely that
also promotions are influenced by the absence behavior of an individual. Moreover, high
paid jobs often require higher education, which also represents a selection. Markussen et al.
(2009) show that educational attainment sharply reduces the rates of entry into absence. This
supports the argument that high paid employees are substantially different with respect to
absence, and suggests a selection mechanism as well. Hence, employees at the higher wage
levels may to some extent have a high wage level due to less sickness absence.
The fixed effects model does not reveal if such a reasoning can be right. The model’s
estimates are displayed in the second column of table 5.3. None of the coefficients on the
wage quantiles are significant, and the estimates which are significant in the other model are
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now much weaker. The fixed effects model alone indicates therefore no relation between wage
and the incidence of absence spells. Comparing both approaches, the fixed effect logit model
suggests at first view that individual heterogeneity biases the results of the logit model, but
the interpretation is more complex.
Recover again that in the fixed effects model any relation between wage and incidence is
identified only by those individuals who change categories. Variables that do not vary within
individuals can statistically not be separated from the fixed effect term. While a possible effect
of weaker incentives at higher wage levels, as outlined above, is not affected by this estimation
property, the possible effect of selection, however, will vanish. For example, low-paid employees
with a low absence incidence, and who later due to selection receive pay rises, do not contribute
to the quantile estimates because the their absence behavior will be captured by the individual
heterogeneity term. This can explain, why also the fourth quantile has become insignificant.
The multinomial logit model, which is used to examine the probability of starting a specific
type of spell, resembles a similar pattern as the simple logit model. The probability of starting
a physician-certified spell is significantly lower at wage levels above the median. For self-
certified spells, the probability is significantly higher in the second wage quantile and lower
in the fourth quantile. While the pattern for higher wages is similar to the results of the
binomial logit models, it becomes also evident that the higher sick leave incidence in the
second quantile is driven by self-certified absence. Whether this higher self-certified absence
in the second quantile is a general phenomena or not is uncertain. An individual effect, as
seen in the binomial models, is likely.
5.2.2 Tenure
The effect of tenure on the probability of starting a spell is intricate to interpret as well. Rel-
ative to those who have been tied to the companies for more than ten years, newly-employed
individuals are less likely to start a new absence spell. For example, an average female em-
ployee in the largest company, in the second wage quantile and with more than ten years of
tenure would have a probability of 1.49% of starting a spell in February. This probability is
conditioned on attendance the previous recorded working day. With only less than one year
of tenure the value falls to 1.23%. The impact of tenure also falls in the next two intervals,
but becomes clearly stronger with five to ten years.
In the random effects model, the effect of different times of tenure on the probability
of starting a new spell is stronger for all intervals, but the effect of three to five years is
insignificant. Thus, it seems that unobservable heterogeneity with respect to the effect of
tenure is present.
Ignoring the last tenure-interval of five to ten years, the pattern could be interpreted as a
revelation of a moral hazard problem related to probation or temporary positions. As soon as
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the period of probation is passed or a temporary position becomes permanent, the incentive
to show reliability with respect to sick leave deteriorates, and the probability of starting new
spells increases. Higher sick leave has normally no consequences for the employee’s position,
but may be result in receiving less extra pay rise, as seen above.
Since the probability of being absent is predicted to be lowest in the first year of tenure,
such a theory is at first view supported by the models. However, because also employees
with five to ten years of tenure have a significantly lower probability of starting a spell, moral
hazard may not be the only explanation, if at all.
Interestingly, a somewhat similar pattern as in the previous models is estimated by the
multinomial logit model as well. The estimates on the probability of starting a new physician-
certified spell show that the impacts of the first, second and fourth tenure-intervals are negative
and decreasing, whereas the effect of three to five years of tenure is insignificant. In the
results describing the probability of starting a new self-certified spell, the second coefficient is
statistically not different from zero, while the other coefficients are negative and quite similar
in size. As above, these results do not indicate that there is a moral hazard problem related
to the transition from temporary positions or probation to permanent positions.
5.2.3 Time before quit
Two interval dummies for the time before quit are included in the logistic regression. Their
purpose is to investigate if there arises a moral hazard problem with respect to sick leave
when an individual leaves the company. In the last months before quit, an employee may have
weaker incentives to be present at work because lower sick leave unlikely is rewarded, and sick
leave hardly can be penalized. The employee leaves the company anyway. Thus, a higher sick
leave is expected.
In the simple logit model, displayed in the first column of table 5.3, the probability of
starting a new spell seems indeed to be higher in the last six months. Contrary, in the
last twelve to six months no significant increase in incidence is predicted. This weakens the
argument that those who leave are not in the best of health. In addition, this result is controlled
for sex, age and calendar months. A selection and calendar time bias, which may arise when
dealing with the time before quit, must therefore be small.
In the logit model which accounts for individual heterogeneity, there is not a significant
higher sick leave incidence in the time before quit. The estimated coefficient for the last
six months is now much smaller and thus statistically not different from zero at a 5% level.
Comparing this result with the significant estimate of the simple logit model, a possible inter-
pretation is that only some of the employees are sicker than others in the time before quit, but
not that many employees to make it a general pattern. While those who have a higher inci-
dence are biasing the estimate in the first logit model, this individual heterogeneity is wiped
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out in random effects model.
Considering the multinomial logit model, more interesting observation can be made. While
the probability of starting a physician-certified spell statistically is not different in an em-
ployee’s last 12 months compared to the time before, the probability of self-certified spells
increases significantly in the last six months. This indicates indeed a strong moral hazard
problem. If the population of employees who leave generally are more sick than others, the
probability of starting a physician-certified spell should be expected to be positive as well.
However, as neither this coefficient is significant, nor for both types of spells the six to twelve
months before quit, it seems that self-certification is abused.
An effects model which accounts for individual heterogeneity could not be estimated.
Therefore, it is unknown whether this effect is a general observation, valid for most of the
employees, or if only some individuals seem to abuse self-certification, but more extensively.
The binomial random effects model suggests the latter. On the other hand, the effect of the
last six months on physician-certified spells is estimated to have a negative sign. This weakens
the effect on the total probability of starting a new sick leave spell in this period. Hence, an
increased incidence of self-certified sick leave in the last six months can be a general pattern,
not only an individual.
5.3 Sick leave duration
Sick leave duration is studied by three different proportional hazard models. The results
are displayed in table 5.4. While the semiparametric Cox model makes no assumption on the
baseline hazard, the Weibull and cloglog model allow for individual heterogeneity. The random
effects in the Weibull model are gamma distributed, and a normal distribution is chosen in
the cloglog model. Since both the baseline hazard and the possibility of individual effects
are expected to influence the estimates, three different models can indicate whether problems
regarding these assumptions arise.
5.3.1 Wage quantiles
Surprisingly, the wage level appears not to affect sick leave duration. In all three model and
except for one single coefficient, the estimates on the company-dependent wage quantiles are
statistically not significant at a 5% level. This is in sharp contrast to the results for the
probability of starting a new absence spell. While the wage level to some extent seems to
determine how likely an individual starts a spell, the length of the spell is not influenced by
being in a particular wage quantiles.
In the Cox model, the second wage quantile has a significant negative impact on the hazard
of ending a spell. This result has no obvious interpretation. There may exist a relation to
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Table 5.4: Sick leave duration
Cox model Weibull model Cloglog model
Wage quantiles:
1st quantile
2nd quantile −0.0845∗ (0.0348) 0.0216 (0.0509) 0.0087 (0.0456)
3rd quantile −0.0205 (0.0336) 0.0442 (0.0555) 0.0241 (0.0473)
4th quantile −0.0415 (0.0355) 0.0076 (0.0612) 0.0121 (0.0527)
Tenure:
0 – 1 year −0.0514 (0.0590) −0.0317 (0.1023) −0.1392 (0.0918)
1 – 3 years −0.1129∗ (0.0533) −0.1641 (0.0950) −0.2617∗∗ (0.0847)
3 – 5 years −0.0322 (0.0526) −0.1563 (0.0916) −0.1687∗ (0.0799)
5 – 10 years −0.0822 (0.0441) −0.0917 (0.0827) −0.1061 (0.0741)
10 + years
Time before quit:
0 – 6 months −0.0556 (0.0408) −0.2526∗∗∗ (0.0529) −0.1704∗∗∗ (0.0497)
6 – 12 months −0.1544∗∗ (0.0519) −0.2536∗∗∗ (0.0609) −0.1592∗∗ (0.0594)
12 + months
Female 0.0944∗∗ (0.0292) 0.1338∗ (0.0660) 0.1785∗∗∗ (0.0503)
Self-certified 0.8559∗∗∗ (0.0279) 1.7154∗∗∗ (0.0299) 1.4567∗∗∗ (0.0346)
Individual effects No effects Random effects Random effects
Log likelihood -59553.862 -10260.587 -14255.928
Observations 39087 39087 39087
* p < 0.05, ** p< 0.01, *** p< 0.001 and standard errors in parenthesis. Additional control variables, not
displayed above, are categorical dummies for age, dummies for company, month, and a constant. Gamma
random effects in the Weibull model. Gaussian random effects in the cloglog model.
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the higher probability of starting a spell, as detected above. However, the coefficients on the
quantiles in the Weibull model and cloglog model have different sizes and signs. Although
not significant, it indicates that unobservable heterogeneity may be important in this case.
Therefore, this result from the Cox model must be considered with caution.
5.3.2 Tenure
The effect of tenure on spell length is more consistent. All coefficients are somewhat similar in
size and have the same sign. In all three models, the negative impact on the hazard is highest
at one to three years of tenure, and decreases thereafter. The effect of the second tenure-
interval is significant in both the Cox model and the cloglog model. In addition, the third
tenure-interval is significant in the cloglog model. In the Weibull model, however, all estimated
coefficients on tenure are insignificant, but this model makes also the strongest assumptions
on the baseline hazard.
At one to three years of tenure, the negative impact on the hazard may be related to the
probability of starting a spell. The logit models above showed that individuals are less likely
to begin a spell in this tenure-interval. It is not surprising, when the probability of going into
sick leave is lower, then those who begin are maybe more sick as well. A selection mechanism
may be present. Contrary, no significant effect of tenure on spell duration is found for newly-
employed individuals. Those with less than a year of tenure are predicted to be less likely
to start a spell. It follows that, if a newly-employed individual becomes sick, a more serious
sickness must be expected, and thus a longer absence duration. No evidence for longer absence
durations in the first year is however found in the results.
5.3.3 Time before quit
To examine if individuals change their absence behavior in the time before leaving the company,
two time-interval dummies, which cover the last year before quit, are included in the models.
In all duration models, the estimated effects on the hazard have the same sign and are similar
in size. The impact of the two intervals in the two random effects models appears also to be
identical, while the coefficient on the last six months in the Cox model is insignificant.
Having less than a year left, it seems that the probability of returning to work is lower. This
fits well with the results for the probability of starting a new spell. The logit models revealed
that moral hazard behavior related to sick leave incidence may occur in the last six months.
The duration models support this view. As the incentives to reduce sick leave deteriorates in
the last months before quit, a longer absence duration is expected.
On the other hand, while a selection regarding absence incidence can be disproved, no
conclusion about selection problems regarding absence duration can be made. In the Weibull
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model and cloglog model, the contributions to the hazard of the two time-intervals are almost
the same. In the Cox model, the last six months are insignificant. Therefore, those who are
on sick leave in the last year might have a lower health status than others.
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6. Conclusion
The aim of this thesis is to examine how economic incentives are related with sick leave
behavior. Two important issues are addressed. First, the reaction of employers to absenteeism
is analyzed. In particular, it is tested if sick leave affects pay rise. In addition, incidence and
duration of sick leave spells and their relation to several economic incentives are examined.
In this manner, moral hazard problems related to sick leave may be detected. Both analyzes
revealed interesting results which partly reconfirm recent research and partly contribute with
new evidence.
6.1 Sick leave and pay rise
Sick leave does affect pay rise. The higher the absence rate the lower is the estimated pay rise,
if any. This result holds for total sick leave in general, but also if self-certified and physician-
certified absence are considered separately. Regarding total sickness absence, even low rates
in the the interval 1 to 3% seem to affect future earnings negatively. Compared to those
with less than 1% total sick leave, a rate of 3 to 5% is estimated to reduce extra pay rise by
around 1.4%. Absence rates above 5% are predicted to be relatively penalized by around 2%.
Moreover, self-certified sick leave appears to affect additional pay rise somewhat stronger than
physician-certified sick leave.
These results seem to be robust with respect to individual heterogeneity. Provided that
such individual effects are constant over time, they seem not to bias the estimates on sick
leave. Therefore, work motivation or other unobservable individual heterogeneity are unlikely
to influence the relation between sick leave and pay rise. In addition, estimation is performed
with several necessary control variables. Hence, the effect of sickness absence on additional
pay rise holds under strict conditions. The analysis is however limited to only one group of
companies.
Nevertheless, at least in the group of companies under study, pay rise is a disciplinary
device. If employees are penalized for being on sick leave, the firm creates an incentive to
be present at work. This argument is based on the assumption that employees actually know
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that such a disciplinary relation exist. For the firm, it has however not necessarily to be an
explicit policy which is enforced enforced consciously. Despite the penalty, an employee may
still find it reasonable to stay at home. The incentive to be present has to be weighted up
against health status or other reasons for being absent. The theory of pay rise as a disciplinary
device helps thus explaining why generous sickness insurance systems are not exploited to full
extent. There is still costs associated with sick leave, even if income is fully replaced under
absence.
Furthermore, the firm is usually unable to observe whether a sick leave spell is well-founded
or not. It is not be in the firm’s interest to penalize legitimate sick leave too hard and thus
induce presenteeism. Physician-certified spells appear, of course, to be more serious and hence
necessary. On the other hand, self-certified absence can be abused easily. This may explain
why the latter is likely to be penalized harder.
The results regarding sick leave and pay rise are, at least for moderate absence rates,
somewhat similar to two recent studies by Hansen (2000) and Markussen (2009). While these
two studies employ register data to investigate whether wage changes could be a disciplinary
device, this analysis examines the question directly at the firm level. The advantage of the
latter is that measures of sick leave, including self-certified absence, and extra pay rise are
highly accurate. Replicating the result at the firm level thus emphasizes that such a relation
is highly reasonable, while the work by Hansen and Markussen suggests that the relation also
holds in general.
6.2 Sick leave and moral hazard
Several of the results regarding incidence and duration of absence spells fit well to relation
between sick leave and pay rise. In the models for incidence and duration, the effect of the
wage level, tenure and the time before before quit are examined. Especially the results related
to the time before an employee leaves the firm are found to be interesting, while the impacts
of the two other variables of interest are more intricate to interpret.
6.2.1 Sick leave before quit
The sick leave system seems to be subject to moral hazard. This becomes evident when
considering absence behavior in the months before an employee leaves the group of companies.
Both the incidence and duration of absence spells are predicted to increase in the last months.
First, regarding incidence, the probability of starting a new spell becomes significantly higher
in the last six months. This increase stems solely from an increased inflow into self-certified
spells. Since this kind of absence is easier to abuse than certified sick leave, it gives a strong
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indication of moral hazard. Furthermore, regarding absence duration, the results also indicate
longer spells in the last twelve months. This supports the moral hazard interpretation.
In the logit models for incidence, there is no evidence that those who leave are sicker than
others. A selection mechanism, which would bias the results for absence incidence, could be
rejected. On the other hand, a selection bias can not be rejected in the models for duration.
Moreover, it is also uncertain if the change in sick leave behavior in the last months holds for
the whole population of employees. Some employees, however, have definitely a higher sick
leave before leaving the group of companies.
Moral hazard, in form of higher sick leave, is expected to arise in the last months of
work because an employee hardly can be penalized for a change in absence behavior. Several
incentives to be present, e. g. pay rise and promotions, deteriorate. There is really no cost
related to refused pay rise or promotion when an employee leaves the firm anyway. This
result is somewhat analogous to the analysis of Ichino and Riphahn (2005), who postulate
that employees are likely to change their absence behavior after probation.
6.2.2 Wage level and tenure
It is expected that the wage level has no direct effect on the incidence or duration. Since the
replacement ratio in Norway is 100% from the first day of absence, no direct cost is linked
to the wage level. Wage quantiles can, however, serve as proxies for different types of jobs.
Following this interpretation, the negative relation between high wages and sick leave may be
the result of a selection. First, low absence rates may give higher extra pay rise. Furtermore,
having a low sick leave may be important for getting high paid jobs. Promotions and higher
education migh be an additional selection mechanism. Although somewhat speculative, such
a theory could explain the pattern revealed for the inflow into sick leave. On the other hand,
no significant correlation between wage and absence duration is found.
Regarding tenure, it is hard to draw a clear-cut conclusion. Although significant effects are
estimated on different tenure categories in almost all models, their interpretation remains a
puzzle. Incidence and duration appear to increase when going from the first year of tenure to
the next tenure categories. However, a convincing effect of probation or temporary positions
on sick leave is not found. Incidence and duration decrease again after five years of tenure.
Hence, while an effect related to job quitting appears to be present, sick leave behavior is
unlikely to change in the beginning of an employees career.
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